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NEW WATER FOR WATER DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Rhett Larson†
Water scarcity often leads to water disputes. New water supplies—such as bulk
water imports, desalination, cloud seeding, or increased stream flows from im-
proved forest management—can mitigate water scarcity and thus help avoid
water disputes. However, new water supplies can also aggravate water disputes
if not developed in concert with legal reforms. This Article evaluates the role
of new water in two cases of water disputes in arid regions and proposes legal
reforms to promote new water as a means of water dispute resolution. The
first case is the adjudication of water rights in the Gila River basin in Arizona.
Improved forestry management could increase water supplies and help resolve
this decades-old dispute, but Arizona law should reconsider how property
rights are assigned to such increased supplies and what legal mechanisms
could encourage investment in forestry management. The second case in-
volved disputes over water resources in refugee host communities in Lebanon
and Jordan. The influx of Syrian refugees into cities in Lebanon and Jordan
can give rise to water disputes. Laws in the countries can be reformed to facili-
tate water augmentation and thereby provide increased supplies to refugee
host communities.
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INTRODUCTION
I am the father of four children. As such, I have a maddening
amount of experience in mediating and adjudicating resource alloca-
tion disputes—ranging from cookies to TV viewing choice. I would
love to brag about my successes in teaching my children about sharing
and selflessness. But too frequently, my approach to these resource
allocation disputes is often to simply grow the pie rather than split it
more equitably (in some cases, this means a literal pie). I buy the extra
cookie instead of having them share, and I extend their bed times to
accommodate everyone’s desire to watch their preferred TV show,
rather than helping them reach a compromise.
I am currently working on two challenging projects involving re-
source allocation disputes that, while far more serious and significant
than any family disagreement, spur a familiar “grow the pie” impulse.
The first project is part of my work as a Senior Research Fellow with
the Kyl Center for Water Policy at the Morrison Institute for Public
Policy, where I work as part of a team attempting to reform the state
of Arizona’s General Stream Adjudications (“GSAs”).1 The GSAs
are large-scale water rights adjudications implicating nearly every
non-Colorado River surface water right in the state.2 The GSAs have
languished for over forty years with no end in sight, and the uncer-
tainty surrounding ownership of water rights—and the priorities and
quantities of those rights—stifles potential water markets and limits
long-term water planning in the state.3 While there are many reasons
for the intractable status of the GSAs, one aggravating factor is the
scarcity of water in Arizona’s arid Sonoran Desert.4 Thus, one poten-
tial mitigating approach is to “grow the pie” by increasing water sup-
plies through desalination, water recycling, or improved watershed
management.
The second project involves my work as the principal investigator
for a $1.94 applied research grant from the U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development (“USAID”) to address water insecurity in the
Middle East.5 The project involves a holistic approach to water devel-
opment in refugee host communities in Lebanon and Jordan.6 Leba-
non and Jordan—already strained by hosting large populations of
1. For an overview of Arizona’s general stream adjudications, see generally Jo-
seph M. Feller, The Adjudication that Ate Arizona Water Law, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 405
(2007).
2. Id.; see also Rhett Larson & Kelly Kennedy, Bankrupt Rivers, 49 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1335, 1348–56 (2016).
3. Larson & Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1348–49.
4. Id. at 1339–40.
5. Jason Franz, ASU and Partners to Bring Clean Water to Middle East Commu-
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Iraqi and Palestinian refugees—have born the greatest burden of ab-
sorbing the Syrian refugee population.7 This growing refugee commu-
nity in already water-scarce cities and towns has the potential to result
in water disputes between refugees and their hosts. The USAID pro-
ject aims to avoid or alleviate such disputes by “growing the pie”—
increasing available water supplies through treatment of otherwise
unusable brackish groundwater and augmenting supplies through an
innovative new technology that generates drinking water from water
vapor in the air.
The problem of water scarcity and resulting disputes are not unique
to these two cases. Indeed, more severe drought conditions caused by
global climate change, along with growing populations and increased
consumption, make water scarcity and its resulting implications for
human conflict a global challenge.8 Of course, cooperation, compro-
mise, and conservation are essential to respond to this global chal-
lenge, and “grow the pie” water strategies can make only so much
progress absent strong “share the pie” water policies.9 Indeed, the
three priorities of water policy should be first, to understand the water
we have; second, to better conserve and protect the water we have;
and third, if necessary and cost-effective, increase the water supply.10
This Article discusses this third priority in the context of the two
projects discussed above, arguing that innovations in policy and tech-
nology can facilitate water supply augmentation for the purpose of
water dispute resolution.
This Article proceeds in three Sections. Section I briefly describes
the water challenges involved in Arizona’s GSAs and refugee host
communities in Jordan and Lebanon. Section II discusses how innova-
tions in technology and water management can help address these
water challenges by increasing the available water supply and evaluat-
ing the costs and benefits of such innovations. Section III proposes
legal reforms to promote water supply augmentation in each of these
projects.
7. Laurie A. Brand & Marc Lynch, How the Refugee Crisis is Transforming the
Middle East, THE WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/30/how-the-refugee-crisis-is-transforming-the-middle-
east/?utm_term=.98c2b0cddd52 [https://perma.cc/B4ZU-CD32].
8. Rhett B. Larson, Reconciling Energy and Food Security, 48 U. RICH. L. REV.
929, 930–32 (2014).
9. See generally Barton H. Thompson, Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy
and Markets, 81 CAL. L. REV. 671 (1993) (broadly discussing the need for conserva-
tion incentives and improved water governance to manage water demand in arid
regions).
10. Rhett B. Larson, Augmented Water Law, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 757, 778
(2016).
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I. THE NEED FOR NEW WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AND ARIZONA
The combination of climate change, population growth, and increas-
ing consumption patterns in many arid regions may make water con-
servation strategies a necessary but insufficient approach to
addressing water scarcity.11 In some cases, regions may not be able to
conserve their way out of the challenge of water scarcity and may
have no other option but to augment their water supplies.12 This Sec-
tion briefly describes the development and current status of four pos-
sible approaches to water augmentation and evaluates their respective
costs and benefits.
A. Arizona’s General Stream Adjudications
Similar to most states in the western U.S., Arizona allocates water
rights based on the doctrine of prior appropriation.13 Under this “first
in time, first in right” doctrine, the state allocates the relative priority
of water rights based on the date a user first puts a specified amount
of water to beneficial use.14 Under the doctrine of prior appropriation,
when surface water flows are insufficient to satisfy the quantities allo-
cated to all right-holders, a senior right-holder may place a “call on
the river.”15 The call requires junior right-holders, with later priority
dates, to stop diverting until the senior’s water right is satisfied.16 Tak-
ing water out of priority interferes with a vested water right, and is
subject to call. However, under the “futile call doctrine” a state will
decline to cut off a junior right-holder if the water would not reach the
senior right-holder downstream regardless of the junior’s
forbearance.17
The beneficial use, diversion point, quantity of water, and relative
priority date of each water right can be difficult to establish with cer-
tainty in many cases.18 There are five reasons for this difficulty in es-
11. Patricia Wouters et al., Water Security, Hydrosolidarity, and International Law:
A River Runs Through It . . . , 19 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 97, 98 n.6 (2009).
12. A. Dan Tarlock, Takings, Water Rights, and Climate Change, 36 VT. L. REV.
731, 750 (2012).
13. Peter L. Reich, The “Hispanic” Roots of Prior Appropriation in Arizona, 27
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 649, 649 (1995).
14. Alexandra B. Klass, Property Rights on the New Frontier: Climate Change,
Natural Resource Development, and Renewable Energy, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 63, 86
(2011).
15. Brian E. Gray, No Holier Temples: Protecting the National Parks Through
Wild and Scenic River Designation, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 551, 579 (1988).
16. Id.; see also Eli Feldman, Death Penalty for Water Thieves, 8 U. DENV. WATER
L. REV. 1, 3 (2004).
17. A. Dan Tarlock, The Law of Equitable Apportionment Revisited, Updated, and
Restated, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 381, 406 (1985).
18. Michael McIntire, The Disparity Between State Water Rights Records and Ac-
tual Water Use Patterns: “I Wonder Where the Water Went?”, 5 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 23, 25 (1970).
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tablishing a predictable and certain water rights regime in Arizona.
First, in the early years following statehood, anyone could claim a
prior appropriation right in Arizona simply by intending to divert
water, actually diverting the water, and then putting the water to a
beneficial use.19 It was not until 1919 that diverters were required to
file notices of intent with the state and receive certificates of water
rights.20 As such, many of the earliest and thus highest priority water
rights in Arizona lack reliable documentation, both because of the
paperless nature of many pre-1919 rights and because of limited fund-
ing for the agency responsible to maintain water rights records—the
Arizona Department of Water Resources (“ADWR”).21
Second, the priority date of a given water right relates back to the
date of the filing of the notice of intent or to the date the diversion
project first began for rights dating before 1919, as long as the water
appropriator was diligent in completing the diversion project.22 For
example, imagine a farmer filed a notice of intent with ADWR to di-
vert water on December 1, 1941, and immediately began to dig a ditch
to divert water to irrigate his farm. Shortly thereafter, the farmer is
drafted into the military and leaves his farm for three years. During
those three years, several others file notices of intent and divert water.
Has the soldier-farmer lost his 1941 priority date, or does his right
“relate back” to that original filing? His priority date is the original
1941 filing date if he is considered to have been diligent during those
three years at war. Determining diligence and “relation back” are dif-
ficult, nuanced inquiries and introduce another degree of uncertainty
regarding the status of Arizona surface water rights.23
Third, a water right holder might lose their priority date and their
water right entirely through forfeiture.24 In Arizona, the failure to use
surface water for five years results in loss of the water right.25 The
principle of forfeiture encourages the use and development of a water
right, but also can discourage conservation and efficiency out of a con-
19. Larson & Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1350; see also Sean E. O’Day, San Carlos
Apache Tribe v. Superior Court: Rejecting Legislative Favoritism in Water Rights Allo-
cations, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 29, 35 (2000).
20. Larson & Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1350; O’Day, supra note 19, at 49–51.
21. Larson & Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1345; O’Day, supra note 19, at 50; see also
Kathleen Ferris, Like Water? Then Don’t Leave Agency in a Drought, USA TODAY:
AZ. CENTRAL (Jan. 25, 2015), http://www.azcentral.com/story/opinion/op-ed/2015/01/
25/arizona-department-water-resources-funding/22250083/ [https://perma.cc/VL9U-
4VKV].
22. Dennett L. Hutchinson, Determining Priority of Federal Reserved Rights, 48 U.
COLO. L. REV. 547, 554 (1977).
23. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Uncertainty and Markets in Water Resources, 36
MCGEORGE L. REV. 117, 118 (2005).
24. See generally Janet C. Neuman & Keither Hirokawa, How Good is an Old
Water Right? The Application of Statutory Forfeiture Provisions to Pre-Code Water
Rights, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2000) (“A central tenet of the prior appro-
priation system is ‘use it or lose it.’”).
25. Id. at 14.
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cern that water saved will result in a water right being forfeited.26 The
risk of forfeiture adds another layer of complexity and uncertainty to
the determination of water rights in Arizona.27
Fourth, under Arizona’s 1919 surface water code, water rights in
Arizona must put water to a beneficial use, without waste. Beneficial
use is the “basis, measure and limit to the use of the water in the
state.”28 Beneficial use includes domestic, municipal, irrigation, stock
watering, recreation, wildlife, water storage, and mining uses.29 As
such, in attempting to establish a clear, predictable water rights re-
gime, Arizona seeks to permit competing users can claim that another
water use is not beneficial or is otherwise wasteful.
Fifth, surface water rights held by Native American tribes and res-
ervations of federal land (like national parks or wildlife refuges) are
clearly established in this prior appropriation framework, but not
clearly quantified.30 Native American tribal land and land owned by
the U.S. federal government comprise an enormous percentage of
western lands.31 When the U.S. federal government reserves land for
any reason, including national parks or tribal reservations, it implicitly
reserves the minimum amount of water necessary to meet the primary
purpose of that reservation.32 These rights are called federally-re-
served rights or Winters rights, after the U.S. Supreme Court decision
in Winters v. United States establishing the doctrine.33 The “primary
purpose” of Indian reservations is to establish a permanent home-
land.34 To quantify the minimum amount of water necessary to
achieve that purpose, courts have generally used the tribal reserva-
tion’s practicably irrigable acreage (“PIA”).35 However, as part of the
GSA, the Arizona Supreme Court considered alternative factors
26. Sharon Megdal et al., The Forgotten Sector: Arizona Water Law and the Envi-
ronment, 1 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 243, 289 (2011).
27. Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search
for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 928–29 (1998).
28. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141(B), held unconstitutional by San Carlos
Apache Tribe v. Superior Court ex rel. Cty. of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179 (Ariz. 1999).
29. § 45-151(A), held unconstitutional by San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior
Court ex rel. Cty. of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179 (Ariz. 1999).
30. Kobi Webb, Federal vs. State Authority to Regulate Groundwater: Concerns
Raised over U.S. Forest Service Proposed Directive, 19 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 297,
301 (2016).
31. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA
18–21 (2012), http://fas.org:8080/sgp/crs/misc/R42346.pdf [https://perma.cc/QEQ6-
WMPM]; see also U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. RESEARCH SERV.: MAJOR USES OF
LAND IN THE UNITED STATES 35–36 (2002).
32. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963); Winters v. United States, 207
U.S. 564, 577 (1908); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976); see also
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 718 (1978).
33. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577–78.
34. Id. at 576–77.
35. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600–01. Included in calculating the PIA are total acreage,
arability of the land, and engineering and economic feasibility. In re Gen. Adjudica-
tion of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 101 (Wyo.
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rather than PIA in quantifying tribal water rights, including tribal cul-
ture, population, and water use plans.36
This more nuanced approach has certain potential advantages over
PIA, but still generates significant uncertainties about how much
water can ultimately be claimed by tribes.37 There is even more uncer-
tainty regarding other federal reservations—unlike national parks or
wildlife refuges, there is at least some history of tribal water rights
settlements and quantifications to guide how Native American Win-
ters rights will be quantified.38 There is little guidance about the mini-
mum amount of water necessary to meet the primary purpose of a
reservation like the Grand Canyon or Yellowstone.39 These federally-
reserved rights generally fit within the prior appropriation regimes of
western states. The priority dates for Winters rights are time immemo-
rial for reserved aboriginal tribal lands40 or the date the reservation
was established for other reservations.41
The complexity created by the lack of adequate documentation for
many senior priority rights, the diligence requirement for priority to
relate back to the original filing, the possibility of a right being lost to
forfeiture or a claim of waste or lack of a beneficial use, and the diffi-
culty in quantifying federally-reserved rights, makes establishing a
clear picture of water rights in Arizona a daunting task—one left to
the courts in the GSA process.42 As Arizona’s population grows and
climate change induces more frequent and severe droughts in the
southwestern U.S., the need to resolve the legal disputes between
water users in Arizona—typified by and largely integrated within the
GSAs—becomes more and more pronounced.43
1988), aff’d by an equally divided court, Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406
(1989).
36. In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. &
Source, 35 P.3d 68, 78–80 (Ariz. 2001).
37. Robert T. Anderson, Indian Water Rights and the Federal Trust Responsibility,
46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 399, 427–30 (2006).
38. Barbara A. Cosens, The Measure of Indian Water Rights: The Arizona Home-
land Standard, Gila River Adjudication, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 835, 865 (2002).
39. Wendy Weiss, The Federal Government’s Pursuit of Instream Flow Water
Rights, 1 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 151, 160–63 (1998).
40. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1414 (9th Cir. 1983).
41. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976).
42. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.065 (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-251 to -264
(2016); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 2000 to 2900 (West 2016); COLO REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-
101 to -602 (2016); IDAHO CODE §§ 42-1401 to -1428 (2016); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 85-2-201 to -243 (2015); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-226 to -231 (2016); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 533.090 to .320, 534.100 (West 2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-4-13 to -
19 (West 2016); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-03-15 to -20 (2016); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
82, §§ 105.6 to .8 (West 2016); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 539.010 to .350, 541.310 to .320
(2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 46-10-1 to -13 (2016); TEX. WATER CODE ANN.
§§ 11.301 to .341 (West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-4-1 to -24 (West 2016); WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 90.03.110 to .245 (2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.4.301 to .331 (2016).
43. See Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Fish, Farms, and the Clash of Cultures
in the Klamath Basin, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 279, 285–86 (2003).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\4-3\TWR301.txt unknown Seq: 8 19-JAN-18 12:42
200 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. [Vol. 4
Before the advent of the GSA process, most water rights disputes in
Arizona involved two-party suits for injunctive relief or suits for dam-
ages against those taking water out of priority, effectively the straight-
forward “call on the river.”44 However, courts needed to adopt unique
procedures as these cases increasingly involved a growing number of
parties over a larger area.45 The goal of the courts in such cases was to
“definitely award the respective rights to the parties to the action,”
but the courts’ decrees often lacked finality and specificity, in large
part because critical parties were not involved in the proceedings, in-
cluding those holding Winters rights.46
In 1952, the U.S. Congress enacted the McCarran Amendment,
which waived the federal government’s sovereign immunity in state
water rights proceedings that were deemed comprehensive over a
whole water basin.47 Effectively, this meant that federal Winters rights
holders—including federal agencies managing national parks and sov-
ereign Native American tribes—could be required to adjudicate their
water rights in state courts, so long as the state proceeding integrated
all of the water right holders and their respective issues over an entire
river system.48 This legislation encouraged states to enact broad, inclu-
sive procedures for adjudication of many water rights claims over
large areas. In short, the legislation established general stream
adjudications.49
As would be anticipated for a process involving so many parties
over a large area, GSAs are time-consuming and resource-intensive.50
Arizona’s Gila River GSA illustrates just how difficult and costly this
process can be for resolving water rights disputes. The early legal dis-
putes in the Gila River basin began before Arizona was a state.51 The
Gila River GSA officially commenced legislation and court filings in
1976, and after over forty years, the legal dispute has still not been
44. Larson & Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1345.
45. Id.
46. Id. (citation omitted); see generally Stephen M. Feldman, The Supreme Court’s
New Sovereign Immunity Doctrine and the McCarran Amendment: Toward Ending
State Adjudication of Indian Water Rights, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 433 (1994).
47. 43 U.S.C.S § 666 (2012); see generally Aubri Goldsby, The McCarran Amend-
ment and Groundwater: Why Washington State Should Require Inclusion of Ground-
water in General Stream Adjudications Involving Federal Reserved Water Rights, 86
WASH. L. REV. 185 (2011).
48. Goldsby, supra note 47, at 186; Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference
Myth: National Interests vs. State Authority under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use,
2006 UTAH L. REV. 241, 268–69 (2006).
49. Scott B. McElroy & Jeff J. Davis, Revisiting Colorado River Water Conserva-
tion District v. United States—There Must Be a Better Way, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 597, 642
(1995).
50. Larson & Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1347–48.
51. See, e.g., Hurley v. Abbott (Kent Decree), Arizona Territorial Court, No. 4564
(Mar. 1, 1910) (slip opinion reprinted and published by the Salt River Valley Water
Users Association).
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resolved or made meaningful progress toward resolution.52 The obsta-
cles to the resolution of the GSA include the reasons discussed above,
including quantification of Winters rights, uncertainty regarding prior-
ity, forfeiture, or beneficial use, and the lack of adequate documenta-
tion and agency funding. However, additional factors further
aggravate the GSA process beyond the normal obstacles facing the
adjudication of water rights generally in prior appropriation regimes.
First, the sheer number of parties involved and the geographic
scope of their claims makes resolution of the GSA extremely difficult.
Today, the Gila River GSA includes over 38,000 parties with nearly
100,000 claims.53 The Gila River stretches over 600 miles across Ari-
zona, and is the second largest river in Arizona, second only to the
Colorado river.54 The Gila River begins in New Mexico, extends west
through the Gila River Indian Community and the Phoenix metropol-
itan area, and then southwest where it joins the Colorado River.55 The
river drains water from nearly 60,000 square miles, totaling half the
land in the state.56 Almost every major river in Arizona flows into the
Gila, including large tributaries like the San Pedro River, Salt River,
and Verde River. About 20% of the water used in Arizona is from the
Gila River and its tributaries.57
The second aggravating factor preventing resolution of the GSA is
the issue of subflow and the bifurcated nature of Arizona’s water
rights regime. Arizona’s GSAs apply only to surface water rights.58
Arizona has a bifurcated water rights system under which surface
water is governed largely by prior appropriation, and groundwater op-
erates under an entirely different set of rules.59 This legal distinction
between surface water and groundwater determines not only what
rules apply to a water right, but also whether or not a right is subject
to adjudication by the GSA court.60 But there is no way to draw a
clear and easily agreed-upon hydrologic line between surface water
52. Larson & Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1348.
53. Id.; see also General Description of Adjudications Program, ARIZ. DEP’T
WATER RES., http://www.azwater.gov/AzDWR/SurfaceWater/Adjudications/ [https://
perma.cc/VT3K-4XLR] (last updated May 31, 2017).
54. See JIM TURNER, ARIZONA: A CELEBRATION OF THE GRAND CANYON STATE
43 (2011).
55. Larson & Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1349.
56. River of the Month Series: August 2012 the Gila River, ENVTL. DEF. FUND
(2012), http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/GilaRiverFactSheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Q34G-BVDD].
57. Feller, supra note 1, at 409.
58. Larson & Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1342.
59. Id. at 1342 nn.32–33. For an overview of Arizona’s complex groundwater law,
see generally Rita Pearson Maguire, Patching the Holes in the Bucket: Safe Yield and
the Future of Water Management in Arizona, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 361 (2007).
60. For an overview of the importance and complexity of the subflow question, see
generally Robert J. Glennon & Thomas Maddock, III, In Search of Subflow: Ari-
zona’s Futile Effort to Separate Groundwater from Surface Water, 36 ARIZ. L. REV.
567 (1994).
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and groundwater.61 A shallow well drilled near a river may mostly be
pumping water directly from the river. A deep well located far from
the river may mostly be pumping water from a deep aquifer with lim-
ited impact on the overlying stream. Water pumped from the surface
water source must have a priority date and be adjudicated as part of
the GSA. Water that is underground but more closely associated with
the surface and thus subject to prior appropriation and the GSA is
called subflow.62
In an interlocutory appeal in the Gila River GSA, the Arizona Su-
preme Court addressed the long-standing subflow question, defining
subflow as waters residing in the “saturated floodplain Holocene allu-
vium.”63 Water pumped from this hazily-defined area immediately be-
neath the surface is subject to the GSA, and water beneath that
subflow zone is not subject to the GSA. But the line is impossible to
draw perfectly, in part because even a well pumping outside of that
area may have a cone of depression that extends into the subflow
zone.64
To progress toward resolving the GSA, reforms are required to ad-
dress the subflow issue while finding a way to decrease the transaction
costs associated with a proceeding that includes thousands of parties.
But perhaps an additional approach to resolving the GSA is to in-
crease the water supply within the basin.
B. Water and Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon
As with the GSAs in Arizona, water disputes in Lebanon and Jor-
dan arise in part from a growing population in an arid region, and
thus, an augmented water supply presents a possible approach to
avoiding or mitigating water disputes. Unlike the Arizona GSAs, how-
ever, the socio-cultural and geopolitical significance of the current
source of much of the population growth—the ongoing Syrian refugee
crisis—presents unique water challenges for communities hosting ref-
ugees.65 This humanitarian crisis is of such a magnitude that it wholly
eclipses any concerns associated with the Arizona GSAs.66 And yet,
61. Id. at 570–74.
62. See Robert J. Glennon & Thomas Maddock, III, In Search of Subflow: Ari-
zona’s Futile Effort to Separate Groundwater from Surface Water, 36 ARIZ. L. REV.
567, 570–71 (1994).
63. In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. &
Source, 9 P.3d 1069, 1073 (Ariz. 2000) (commonly referred to as Gila River IV).
64. Id. at 1073–82.
65. Nicholas Burns & David Miliband, Opinion, Syria’s Worsening Refugee Crisis




66. See Griff Witte, New U.N. Report Says World’s Refugee Crisis is Worse than
Anyone Expected, THE WASH. POST (June 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/world/europe/new-un-report-says-worlds-refugee-crisis-is-worse-than-anyone-expect
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because both present challenges associated with water management,
both hold lessons for how law might be reformed to encourage invest-
ment in water supply augmentation.
The ongoing civil war in Syria has resulted in the most serious refu-
gee crisis since World War II.67 The two countries that have born
among the greatest burdens of absorbing Syrian refugees are two of
Syria’s neighbors—Jordan and Lebanon.68 As of early 2017, over one
million Syrian refugees reside in Lebanon and over 600,000 in Jor-
dan.69 One in every four people in Lebanon is a Syrian refugee, and
one in every eight people in Jordan is a Syrian refugee.70 While U.N.
refugee camps in Jordan absorb a certain number of Syrians fleeing
conflict, there are no such formal refugee camps in Lebanon, and most
Syrian refugees in both countries do not settle in camps, but in cities
and towns amongst Jordanians and Lebanese citizens.71
This influx of refugees places an enormous strain on host communi-
ties in Lebanon and Jordan and, in some instances, has resulted in
tensions between refugees and their hosts.72 Both countries were al-
ready struggling with economic challenges, with annual GDP growth
dropping from 8.5% to 1.4% in Lebanon and from 5.5% to 2.7% in
Jordan between 2009 and 2012.73 Most Syrian refugees in Jordan have
settled in the country’s most densely populated governorates—Am-
man, Irbid, and Zarqa—where 57% of Jordanians already live below
the poverty line.74 In Lebanon, 60% of Syrian refugees have settled in
the north or in the Beka’a Valley—the two poorest regions in
Lebanon.75
Perhaps even more significant than this general economic strain, the
refugee crisis imposes an enormous strain on an already difficult water
ed/2015/06/17/a49c3fc0-14ff-11e5-8457-4b431bf7ed4c_story.html?utm_term=.8da6939
73971 [https://perma.cc/78ZY-46B2].
67. Patrick Boehler & Sergio Peçanha, The Global Refugee Crisis, Region by Re-
gion, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/09/
world/migrants-global-refugee-crisis-mediterranean-ukraine-syria-rohingya-malaysia-
iraq.html.
68. See Deidre McPhillips, The Tragic Numbers Behind Syria’s Refugees, U.S.





71. Lara Saade & Cynthia Delgadillo, Syrian Refugees Living in Jordan and Leba-
non: Young, Female, at Risk, WORLD BANK (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.worldbank.
org/en/news/press-release/2015/12/16/syrian-refugees-living-in-jordan-and-lebanon-
caught-in-poverty-trap [https://perma.cc/8FQY-33LU].
72. Omar Dahi, The Refugee Crisis in Lebanon and Jordan: The Need for Eco-
nomic Development Spending, 47 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 11 (Sept. 2014).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 12.
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management situation in both Lebanon and Jordan.76 Both Lebanon
and Jordan fall below the water poverty line.77 In Jordan, Syrian refu-
gees have increased total water consumption by 5.5% since 2012, a
significant increase over such a short time and in such an arid coun-
try.78 In Lebanon, groundwater abstraction in some regions has in-
creased due to the influx of refugees to the point of drying up wells,
resulting in many Syrian refugees in Lebanon living on less than two
gallons of clean water each day.79 The presence of Syrian refugees,
and the strain their presence places on already limited water re-
sources, has caused tensions between refugees and host communities
in both Lebanon and Jordan.80
In Shatila, a refugee-host community in Lebanon, over pumping
and deepening of wells has resulted in withdrawals of highly brackish
groundwater that is not potable.81 In Jordan, refugee-host communi-
ties are similarly facing challenges with strains on available water re-
sources, resulting in attempts to rely on groundwater with high salinity
levels.82 If these brackish groundwater sources could be cost-effec-
tively treated to potable standards, they may be the key to injecting a
sufficient supply of clean water to alleviate tensions between Syrian
refugees and their host communities in Lebanon and Jordan.
76. See Mohamed F. Hamoda, Water Strategies and Potential Water Reuse in the
South Mediterranean Countries, 165 DESALINATION 31 (2004).
77. Hatem Jemmali & Caroline A. Sullivan, Multidimensional Analysis of Water
Poverty in MENA Region: An Empirical Comparison with Physical Indicators, 115
SOC. INDICATORS RES. 253, 277 (2014); Eran Feitelson & Jonathan Chenoweth, Water
Poverty: Towards a Meaningful Indicator, 4 WATER POL’Y 263, 271 (2002).
78. Aleena Farishta, The Impact of Syrian Refugees on Jordan’s Water Resources
and Water Management Planning (May 2014) (unpublished M.S. thesis) (on file with
the Columbia University Academic Commons), https://academiccommons.columbia.
edu/catalog/ac:175300.
79. Stephen J. Klingseis, Syrian Refugees: Are they a Non-Traditional Threat to
water Supplies in Lebanon and Jordan? (Sept. 2016) (unpublished M.A. thesis) (on
file with the Naval Post Graduate School), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=796642.
80. Taylor Luck, In Jordan, Tensions Rise Between Syrian Refugees and Host
Community, THE WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/middle_east/in-jordan-tensions-rise-between-syrian-refugees-and-host-commu
nity/2013/04/21/d4f5fa24-a762-11e2-a8e2-5b98cb59187f_story.html?utm_term=.61a0b2
11f3f0 [https://perma.cc/KA6F-AMGD]; Tim Midgley, Johan Eldebo, Amir Amarani
& Nadene Robertson, Under Pressure: The Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on
Host Communities in Lebanon, WORLD VISION INT’L (July 12, 2013), http://wvi.org/
europe/publication/under-pressure-impact-syrian-refugee-crisis-host-communities-
lebanon [https://perma.cc/DR5R-PD4M].
81. Peter Schwartzstein, Syrian Refugees in Lebanon Camp Reliant on ‘Hell Water’
that Reduces Metal to Rust, THE GUARDIAN (May 26, 2015), https://www.theguardi
an.com/global-development/2015/may/26/syrian-refugees-lebanon-shatila-camp-hell-
water [https://perma.cc/Y9J7-2W7F].
82. Khaled A. Alqadi & Lalit Kumar, Water Policy in Jordan, 30 INT’L J. WATER
RES. DEV. 322, 323 (2013).
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II. NEW WATER SOURCES FOR WATER DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The water disputes between users involved in Arizona’s GSAs and
between refugees and their host communities in Lebanon and Jordan
could certainly benefit from improved water conservation and man-
agement and from governance reforms that facilitate collaboration
and dispute resolution. These are complex problems requiring multi-
ple, adaptive solutions. This Section proposes solutions based on
water supply augmentation in both the Arizona GSA context and the
refugee host community context.
A. New Water and the Arizona General Stream Adjudications
There are several potential sources of augmented water supplies to
help alleviate water scarcity and thereby facilitate resolution of the
GSAs. But many of these sources come at a high cost and with a fairly
high degree of uncertainty and controversy. Arizona could support
sea water desalination in Mexico, or California could increase water
supplies there in exchange for a transfer of water rights from those
jurisdictions to Arizona on the Colorado River.83 But such an arrange-
ment would have significant political and legal obstacles, and desalina-
tion is energy-intensive and costly, with potentially damaging
environmental impacts.84 Other possible water augmentation ap-
proaches, such as cloud seeding or bulk water imports, would also
have their own political and legal obstacles, potentially high costs, and
possible negative effects on the environment.85
Watershed management is a possible avenue for water augmenta-
tion in Arizona that would potentially garner greater consensus from
the public and water policymakers in supporting investments and legal
reforms. Watershed management is the improved maintenance of for-
ests for the purpose of protecting and enhancing water supplies, in-
cluding in particular the removal of scrub brush, immature trees, and
invasive species from a catchment.86 Watershed management has
many potential benefits. First, removal of some vegetation, such as
invasive species or scrub brush, can enhance forest health by allowing
other trees to fully mature.87 Second, vegetation removal could result
83. Rhett B. Larson, Innovation and International Commons: The Case of
Desalination under International Law, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 759, 761 (2012).
84. Id. at 766.
85. Larson, supra note 10, at 759–65.
86. See Diane E. McConkey, Federal Reserved Rights to Instream Flows in the
National Forests, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 305, 310–11 (1994); see also Brandon Loomis,
Reduction in Tree Cover Over Rivers Could Mean More Water Flow, USA TODAY:
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in decreased wildfire risks.88 Third, the improved forest health and
decreased wildfire events would decrease erosion and runoff to rivers
and thus improve water quality and wildlife habitat.89 Fourth, respon-
sible and sustainable thinning of forests could increase flows to the
river by removing plants that would otherwise have taken up that
water, and thus augment water supplies.90
Improved forest management protects snowpack from melting too
fast, and limits water losses from evaporation.91 Additionally, without
effective watershed management, wildfires may expose forest
snowpack to greater evaporation losses.92 Decades of research
throughout forests in the western U.S. have documented the potential
for improved forest management to enhance water supplies.93
The recognized benefits and the broad support for watershed man-
agement in Arizona can be illustrated by the ongoing implementation
of the Four Forest Restoration Initiative (“4FRI”).94 This endeavor is
the largest watershed management project in the United States. It is
aimed at improving water supplies in Arizona by rehabilitating the
large ponderosa pine forests in the Verde River basin. The Verde
River is one of the main tributaries of the Gila River and a region
within the jurisdiction of the Gila River GSA.95 The 4FRI project
commenced in 2011 and includes four national forests.96 The project is
a partnership between the U.S. Forest Service, state and tribal land
management agencies, local governments, non-governmental conser-
vation organizations, and water and energy utilities.97 It aims to reha-
bilitate 2.4 million acres of forest land in the upland regions of the
Verde River basin, including forest thinning, invasive species removal,
prescribed preventative forest burns, and incorporation of a 20-year
adaptive management plan.98 Many of the parties promoting and en-
88. Id. The ultimate effectiveness of watershed management in addressing wildfire
concerns is the subject of intense scholarly debate. See generally WILDFIRE POLICY:
LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVES (Karen Bradshaw Schulz & Dean Lueck eds.,
2012).
89. Id.
90. Id.; see also Loomis, supra note 86.
91. Alden R. Hibbert, Water Yield Improvement Potential by Vegetation Manage-
ment on Western Rangelands, 19 J. AM. WATER RES. ASSOC. 375, 378–79 (1983).
92. See generally id. at 379.
93. Charles A. Troendle, Marc S. Wilcox, Greg S. Bevenger, & Laurie S. Porth,
The Coon Creek Water Yield Augmentation Project: Implementation of Timber Har-
vesting Technology to Increase Streamflow, 143 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT 179
(2001).
94. Paul Summerfelt, Will AZ Learn or Burn? Can AZ Learn to Burn?: The Flag-
staff Experience, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 157, 176 (2016).
95. Annette Fredette, 4FRI and the NEPA Process, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 139 (2016).
96. Karen Bradshaw Schulz & Dean Lueck, Contracting for Control of Landscape-
Level Resources, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2507, 2537–40 (2015).
97. Diane Vosick, Democratizing Federal Forest Management Through Public Par-
ticipation and Collaboration, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 93 (2016).
98. Id.
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gaging in the 4FRI are also parties to the Gila River GSA, and their
participation is motivated (in part) by the desire to enhance stream
flows in the basin to alleviate water disputes.99
Despite the potential benefits from watershed management pro-
grams like the 4FRI, such vegetation removal projects can negatively
impact wildlife habitat if done unsustainably, resulting in reduced
shade cover, fewer nesting areas, and increased access by grazing live-
stock to fragile river banks.100 Additionally, removing scrub brush, im-
mature trees, and invasive species for improved forest health can be
expensive, and lacks reliable returns on investments; partly because
such removed vegetation has a narrow trunk diameter unsuitable for
timber.101 Burning removed vegetation for energy or using removed
vegetation for paper production are also possibilities, but such indus-
tries can result in pollution from energy production emissions and pa-
per manufacturing.102
Watershed management projects have potential legal challenges in
addition to these environmental and economic risks. Under prior ap-
propriation regimes, the law distinguishes between developed water
and salvaged water in allocating water rights.103 Developed water is
new water imported into a catchment not previously part of the ba-
sin—like bulk water imports or sea water desalination.104 Salvaged
water, on the other hand, is water that is part of the basin but not
accessible, and is then made usable by human intervention.105 An ex-
ample of salvaged water is brackish groundwater—found in deep, fos-
sil aquifers, developed through advanced drilling techniques, and
made usable by water treatment.106
Developed water is owned by the party that invested in its genera-
tion, and the rights to that generated quantity of water are indepen-
dent of the prior appropriation system.107 However, salvaged water
remains part of the priority system, and the party that salvages the
water by making it accessible and usable has no special or superior
99. Id.
100. H. Michael Rauscher, Ecosystem Management Decision Support for Federal
Forests in the United States: A Review, 114 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT 173 (1999).
101. Elizabeth Long, Wyoming v. USDA: A Look Down the Road at Management
of Inventoried Roadless Areas for Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation, 40
ECOLOGY L.Q. 329, 341 (2013); but see Schulz & Lueck, supra note 96, at 2539 (dis-
cussing the incentives some forest landowners have to invest in watershed protection).
102. Id.; see also Emery Cowan, How Good Earth’s Plans Have Played Out, ARIZ.
DAILY SUN (Sept. 26, 2015), http://azdailysun.com/news/local/how-good-earth-s-
plans-have-played-out/article_70741036-707d-508c-8ac9-a94e1ea8b999.html [https://
perma.cc/Q8WA-FFTM].
103. Larson, supra note 10, at 765–67.
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claim to the water.108 For example, in Southeastern Colorado Water
Conservancy District v. Shelton Farms, a party that removed invasive
species from the banks of a stream claimed rights to the augmented
water created by such removal.109 The court held that such water was
salvaged water and subject to prior appropriation.110
The distinction between developed and salvaged water is both
highly relevant, and potentially highly problematic, for water augmen-
tation projects in general, and for watershed management initiatives
in particular. Water generated from seawater desalination is likely de-
veloped water, whereas water generated from desalinating brackish
groundwater or saline-contaminated surface water is likely salvaged
water.111 This distinction thus potentially encourages seawater
desalination over treating pollution or improving in-land water sup-
plies.112 Water generated through watershed management is likely sal-
vaged water, as it mirrors in most respects the exact facts of the
Shelton Farms case, which held that water generated by invasive spe-
cies removal be salvaged and subject to a senior rights holder’s prior-
ity and a call on the river. In such a case, what incentives exist for
improved watershed management if those investing in such manage-
ment cannot secure the benefit of augmented water? And how can the
law in Arizona be reformed to encourage watershed management like
the 4FRI as a means of advancing the resolution of the GSAs?
B. New Water and Refugee Host Communities
Similar questions confront communities in Lebanon and Jordan that
host ever-growing Syrian refugee populations, although the stakes are
even higher. Can water disputes be avoided or mitigated between host
communities and refugees by reforming laws to encourage develop-
ment of new water supplies? In an attempt to respond to this question,
the U.S. Agency for International Development (“USAID”) granted
$1.94 million to an international partnership between Arizona State
University, Zero Mass Water, GreenCo, H2O for Humanity,
MercyCorps in Jordan, and the René Moawad Foundation in Lebanon
to address water security issues in the Middle East and North Africa.
The project is called “A Holistic Water Solution for Underserved and
Refugee Host Communities in Lebanon and Jordan” (“The
Project”).113
108. Id.
109. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Sheldon Farms, Inc., 529 P.2d 1321,
1323–24 (Colo. 1974).
110. Id. at 1325.
111. Larson, supra note 10, at 765–67.
112. Id.
113. For more information about the project, see A Holistic Water Solution for Un-
derserved and Refugee Host Communities in Lebanon and Jordan, ARIZ. STATE UNI-
VERSITY, https://sustainability.asu.edu/sustainabilitysolutions/programs/solutions
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The Project is holistic in the sense that it attempts to address the
four primary aims of water policy—quality, quantity, sustainability,
and security. The Project addresses water quality by adapting the suc-
cessful business model and technology used by H2O for Humanity
(“HFH”) in serving tens of thousands of people in India in the context
of refugee-host communities in Lebanon and Jordan.114 HFH imple-
mented reverse osmosis water treatment kiosks in communities where
entrepreneurs treat brackish groundwater sources and sell drinking
water-quality water in businesses that are sustainable with charges as
low as 0.2 cents per liter.115
On the quantity aspect of this holistic approach, Zero Mass Water
(“ZMW”) has developed a solar-powered unit that can generate
drinking water from water vapor in the air.116 This technology allows
for augmented water supplies at the household level relying on renew-
able, low-cost energy. On the sustainability aspect of water policy, Ar-
izona State University has connected HFH’s technology to solar
power that allows the water treatment system to operate independent
of the grid and the modulate between on-and-off-grid power, thus
making the system both more reliable and resilient in power outages
and more sustainable in relying on a renewable energy source.117 The
concept of sustainability is not just environmental sustainability, but
also the financial sustainability of the project. Each kiosk is either in-
tegrated within the existing water utility network of the host commu-
nity or else is implemented as an independent business, providing
training and employment opportunities while establishing a sustaina-
ble business model with water charges below market rates.118 The
water security aspect of the project is achieved with GreenCo’s Flat
Pak technology, which is a food-grade plastic collapsible water storage
tank that allows each kiosk to store water in cases of system failure,
drought, or other emergencies.119
Cutting-edge sustainable treatment, augmentation, and storage
technologies can take the project only so far. In-country partners—
MercyCorps in Jordan and the René Moawad Foundation in Leba-
non—provide community-level guidance to ensure access, training,
site-selection, and remote monitoring of system integrity and water
services/holistic-water-solutions/ [https://perma.cc/JBH4-MM5H] (last visited Sept.
25, 2017) [hereinafter A Holistic Water Solution].
114. For more information about H2O for Humanity, see H2O FOR HUMANITY,
http://www.h2oforhumanity.com/ [https://perma.cc/EMM8-RLLK] (last visited Sept.
17, 2017).
115. Id.
116. For more information about Zero Mass Water, see ZERO MASS WATER, https:/
/zeromasswater.com/technology/homeowner/ [https://perma.cc/L556-88XM] (last vis-
ited Sept. 25, 2017).
117. See A Holistic Water Solution, supra note 113.
118. Id.
119. For more information on GreenCo, see GREENCO WATER, http://greenco-
water.com/ [https://perma.cc/95YU-LDXZ] (last visited Sept. 25, 2017).
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quality.120 The partnership established in this project, and the support
of USAID, aims to avoid or mitigate water disputes between refugee-
host communities and Syrian refugees by providing affordable and
sustainable augmented water supplies in the communities, as well as
employment opportunities, community engagement in water resource
development, and applied research in water treatment, water supply
augmentation and storage, and water governance.
The governance aspect of the project raises important research
questions that go the heart of the long-term viability of such water
supply enhancement projects. Who does, or should, own the gener-
ated water supplies? How do ownership concepts change between
countries, and even between and within a community? How can the
project be adapted to respond to different community conceptions of
water rights and water valuation? What legal and administrative hur-
dles exist that might frustrate efforts to improve water access in refu-
gee-host communities, and how might law be reformed to encourage
investment in community- and household-scale sustainable water solu-
tions to respond to the strains placed on water supplies by the refugee
crisis?
III. LEGAL REFORMS FOR NEW WATER TO ADDRESS
WATER DISPUTES
As noted above, both the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan and Leba-
non, and the ongoing water disputes in Arizona under the GSA, raise
difficult legal questions surrounding water rights and the possibility of
legal reforms to encourage a “grow the pie” approach to water dispute
resolution.  This Section discusses and evaluates possible legal reforms
to encourage water augmentation to accelerate the resolution of the
GSAs and to alleviate strains on water resources in refugee-host com-
munities in Lebanon and Jordan.
A. Reforms for New Water in the Arizona’s GSAs
For legal reforms aimed at water supply augmentation to meaning-
fully advance the GSAs, such reforms should simultaneously address
the complicated issue of subflow. Many subflow pumpers risk losing
their water rights entirely in the adjudication if their pumping is
deemed surface water and with a priority date so junior as to be per-
petually subject to call on oversubscribed rivers. But such pumpers—
some of whom are cities and towns—must find some way to maintain
their water supplies while at the same time making senior water-rights
holders whole for interference with vested rights. Addressing the sub-
120. For more information on the René Moawad Foundation, see RMF, http://
www.rmf.org.lb/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2017). For more information on Mercy Corps in
Jordan, see MERCY CORPS: JORDAN, https://www.mercycorps.org/countries/jordan
[https://perma.cc/5UWU-4XCD] (last visited Sept. 25, 2017).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\4-3\TWR301.txt unknown Seq: 19 19-JAN-18 12:42
2018] NEW WATER FOR WATER DISPUTE RESOLUTION 211
flow problem should be coupled with the need for greater investment
in water augmentation projects, like watershed management similar to
the 4FRI. One possible innovation to simultaneously address subflow
and encourage investment in watershed management is the establish-
ment of regional water augmentation authorities (“RWAAs”).
Under this RWAA approach, the Arizona Department of Water
Resources (“ADWR”) would apply a mathematical model to assess a
well’s relationship to subflow, based on factors including its depth,
proximity to the stream, pumping capacity, and the well’s surrounding
hydrogeology.  The model would generate a conservative estimate of
the well’s impact on senior surface water-rights holders. That estimate
would then be used by ADWR to establish an augmentation fee owed
by the subflow pumper, and to be paid to the RWAA. The RWAA
would be a quasi-municipal entity, authorized by statute and similar to
already-existing water conservation or irrigation districts, to collect
augmentation fees paid by RWAA members and based on the ADWR
model. The RWAA boundaries would be based on the geographies of
river sub-basins. Members would voluntarily join the RWAA. Subflow
pumpers within the RWAA boundaries who choose not to become
RWAA members would then pursue final adjudication of their water
rights under the GSA, and risk the possibility that the GSA court
would find that their well is appropriating subflow and has a priority
date subject to a call on the river.
The RWAA would then use the funds paid by its members’ fees to
invest in water augmentation projects to compensate senior water-
rights holders for the impacts on their vested water rights from
RWAA members’ subflow pumping. As long as RWAA members pay
their fee, they are shielded from liability to senior rights holders for
any interference with those vested rights caused by member subflow
pumping. The RWAA would assume responsibility for mitigating im-
pacts through investing in water augmentation projects and would as-
sume liability for any failure to adequately offset impacts to senior
rights holders. One advantage of the RWAA is that it lowers the enor-
mous transaction costs associated with negotiating with thousands of
potential subflow appropriators by having those pumpers become
members of an association that negotiates, settles, and compensates
on their behalf.
The RWAA could pursue augmentation in several ways. Brackish
groundwater desalination, in a form similar to that used in the projects
in Jordan and Lebanon, could provide a source of augmented
water.121 Desalination has potentially high energy and environmental
costs, but the technology has rapidly improved in both energy effi-
ciency and overall costs in recent years, and the solar-energy compo-
121. See generally Symposium, Desalination in California: Should Ocean Waters Be
Utilized to Produce Freshwater?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1343, 1343–46 (2006).
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nents integrated in the USAID holistic water solutions project could
further reduce costs and enhance sustainability.122 The viability of
such an approach would depend on whether these desalination sys-
tems could be scaled up to meet the demands of senior water-rights
holders, and the extent to which such systems could address environ-
mental impacts of desalination, including the disposal of the brine
waste stream from reverse osmosis treatment.
In addition to brackish groundwater desalination, RWAAs could
pursue watershed management projects to mitigate member impacts
on senior water-rights holders, by investing in projects similar to the
4FRI. But to make such investments viable, reforms may be necessary
to the way the law treats supplies augmented by watershed manage-
ment or treatment of brackish sources, as both are likely to be consid-
ered salvaged water.
To encourage investments in forestry management and treatment of
brackish water sources, water law could be reformed to grant some
limited rights to salvaged water. For example, all water rights transac-
tions within a particular area could include a hold-back of a certain
percentage of the total quantity of water transferred. The water held
back from each transfer would be held in trust by ADWR for the pres-
ervation of in-stream flows, and as a discounted source of water avail-
able to certain designated groups, such as RWAAs.123
First, discounted water rights could be purchased by RWAAs that
invest in watershed management. Second, RWAAs engage in
remediation of water contamination or brackish sources. The discount
on those water rights would depend on the RWAA making a demon-
stration that investments improved water access. Such discounted
water rights could then be transferred by the RWAA to senior water-
rights holders, who would then hold those rights with the same prior-
ity date as the rights impacted by RWAA member pumping.
The establishment of RWAAs would make it simpler for senior
water right holders to identify parties to compensate them for subflow
impacts, while still allowing subflow pumpers to retain some access to
water supplies. Furthermore, the fees paid to RWAAs could provide
some funds to invest in water augmentation projects, like improved
forestry management, that sometimes struggle to attract capital. By
establishing a bank of discounted water rights available to RWAAs,
salvaged water efforts like forestry management can result in actual
claims to get water without a wholesale recognition of priority for sal-
vaged water projects, which could prove a reform far too disruptive
for most prior appropriation regimes. RWAAs could thus be a critical
122. Rhett B. Larson, Innovation and International Commons: The Case of
Desalination under International Law, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 759, 766 (2012).
123. See, e.g., Ivan M. Stoner, Leading a Judge to Water: In Search of a More Fully
Formed Washington Public Trust Doctrine, 85 WASH. L. REV. 391 (2010).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\4-3\TWR301.txt unknown Seq: 21 19-JAN-18 12:42
2018] NEW WATER FOR WATER DISPUTE RESOLUTION 213
innovation in moving toward a resolution of Arizona’s GSAs through
investment in new water sources.
B. Reforms for New Water in Refugee Host Communities
New water development like the holistic water solutions project in
Lebanon and Jordan will likely require reforms similar in degree, if
not in kind, to the establishment of RWAAs to address Arizona’s
water dispute challenges. While a deep examination of the laws im-
pacting water development in Jordan and Lebanon is outside the
scope of this Article, based on my experience in these countries, there
are some possible reforms that would encourage investment in new
water sources aimed at mitigating water disputes in refugee host
communities.
First, government exemptions for well permits and fees for any well
with a total dissolved solids (“TDS”) concentration above 1,800 ppm
would lower the costs associated with treating those wells with salinity
levels too high to provide drinking water without additional treat-
ment. Second, legal reforms should clarify that parties generating aug-
mented water from water vapor—like the ZMW system—hold title to
that generated water, which would encourage investments and expan-
sions of such systems. Third, laws that recognize title in the brine
waste stream from brackish groundwater treatment in the treating
party would also encourage implementation of brackish groundwater
reverse osmosis systems like H2O for Humanity. In those instances,
even if the government retains title to the groundwater, the brine
stream can be sold for construction purposes and provide an addi-
tional source of revenue for parties investing in water treatment, to
make those businesses financially sustainable.
While not necessarily a legal reform, more research is needed in
Jordan, Lebanon, and throughout the Middle East and North Africa
(“MENA”) region to map out differences in communal conceptions of
water rights and water valuation. The concept that water is an inalien-
able right to all is a principle embedded in Sharia law. While Sharia is
not formally codified in all—or even most—MENA countries, it re-
mains influential in many ways. The Majalla, or Ottoman Code, on
water resource management has influenced water laws in many parts
of the MENA region and creates a certain degree of uniformity within
the region, some of which is based on Sharia concepts that persist
through the Majalla and into current domestic water laws and policies
of former Ottoman states.124 Even where such Sharia influences are
absent or not pronounced, community norms may nevertheless recog-
nize Sharia water law concepts, which could be accounted for in the
implementation of new water projects in the MENA region.
124. See Ali Ahmad, Islamic Water Law as a Comparative Model for Maintaining
Water Quality, 5 J. OF ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 159 (2000).
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Unsurprisingly, given its roots in the arid Arabian Peninsula, Sharia
focuses a great deal on water rights and the resolution of water-re-
lated disputes.125 Under Sharia, there are two fundamental water
rights precepts.126 First, shafa, or the “right of thirst,” establishes a
universal right for all humans to have access to drinking water.127 Sec-
ond, shirb, or the “right to irrigate,” provides a right for farmers to
water their crops.128 While these two principles are interpreted and
implemented in dramatically different ways depending on geography
and sect, there are certain generalized principles, including a focus on
equity in water distribution.129 These interpretations can range from
an absolute prohibition against charging for water services, to distinc-
tions between private and public water rights with water charges being
acceptable for private waters, to the degree to which certain taxes
should apply to the development of water resources.130 Increased re-
search into whether and how the formal laws of MENA countries, and
the norms of communities in the region, interpret and implement
these rights would assist in adapting new water projects to the unique




While Arizona’s water dispute challenges complicate long-term
water planning and generate uncertainties in water markets, the water
challenges facing refugee host communities in Lebanon and Jordan
are orders of magnitude more serious and complicated. Water is fre-
quently a source of contention, as illustrated by the very word “rival,”
which comes from the Latin word rivalis—meaning people who share
a river.131 And yet despite the potential for water disputes, water is
more frequently a source of human cooperation. It is not coincidence
that our oldest civilizations—and thus our earliest successes in broad,
complex cooperative systems—arose around rivers in the desert, like
125. Naser I. Faruqui, Water, Human Rights, and Economic Instruments: The Is-
lamic Perspective, 9 WATER NEPAL 197, 203 (2003). Indeed, the word “Shari’ah” itself
is closely related to water, and can be interpreted to mean “the source of water.”
James Salzman, Thirst: A Short History of Drinking Water, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
94, 100 (2006).
126. Faruqui, supra note 125, at 201–03.
127. Id.; see also Chibli Mallat, The Quest for Water Use Principles, in WATER IN
THE MIDDLE EAST (M.A. Mallat & I.B. Chibli eds., 1995).
128. Faruqui, supra note 125, at 202.
129. Id.; see also Mallat, supra note 127.
130. Jackson Morill & Jose Simas, Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA
Countries, in WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD (N. Vijay Jagannathan, Ahmed Shawky
Mohamed, & Alexander Kremer eds., 2009).
131. Joseph W. Dellapenna, International Law’s Lessons for the Law of the Lakes,
40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 747, 763–64 (2007).
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the Tigris, Euphrates, and Nile. Water can be a source of cooperation
with adequate investment and wise management. And sometimes,
new water sources can serve as a catalyst for transforming water dis-
putes into opportunities for water cooperation.
